When we saw the Ford announcement that the new Fusion Hybrid is "the most patented car in history," we wondered how it stacked up against a truly revolutionary car like the EV1. Turns out, whatever patents were used to get that initial electric car to market, they weren't as numerous.

A Ford PR rep told us that "The [Fusion] patent claim does not include concept or prototype cars. The 119 that Ford claims for the 2010 Fusion Hybrid are in 'new' patents and patent applications." By comparison, the EV1 "was the world's most technologically advanced vehicle platform, with 23 new patents in a variety of new technologies," according to GM. Not that these numbers really matter or anything, just thought it was an interesting comparison.

I really stepped in it last time by stating that GM never owned patent rights to Ovonic's NiMH batteries and never sold them to an oil company, and that no one sued Toyota. I believed those statements to be true at the time, but several of you straightened me out.

However, since that complex issue has little to do with range anxiety, I'll come back to it at the end. Meanwhile, I wanted to address more of your comments and responses before moving on to new topics in future essays. Here goes:

EV1 was a low-volume vehicle made of a bunch of low-volume parts with little shared with GM's other products and released on a limited-availability basis. I have no problem with GM portraying it as a testbed, an excellent testbed at that, but to use the defense that GM was trying to make it succeed in the marketplace is just plain silly. – meme

To make the assumption that GM's BEV program was about only EV1 is silly. It was the pioneer vehicle on which the technology was developed. We hoped it would have more takers but never kidded ourselves that an expensive two-seater with very limited range would sell in big numbers or ultimately turn a profit. What should have been profitable long term, if only the enabling (lithium-polymer) battery had arrived as planned, were more practical and affordable follow-on BEVs, plus selling the technology to other automakers.

(more after the jump)

I left the dinner meeting around 9:00, with home roughly 60 miles away...no challenge for an engine-powered vehicle, even relatively low on fuel. You can always find an open station.

Not so on this 1997 night. I was driving an EV1 development vehicle freshly equipped with an experimental nickel-metal-hydride (NiMH) battery pack. We were developing NiMH - which was promising double the usable energy of our '97 advanced lead-acid (PbA) packs in about the same (nearly 1200-lb.) package - for the '99 model year.

As GM Advanced Technology Vehicles' test and development manager at the time, I routinely drove PbA EV1s home and back, re-charging overnight, during the summer. My 60-mile mid-Michigan commute was easily doable in warm, but not cold, temperatures.

When the mercury sank, so did range, due partly to reduced PbA performance but mostly to lost vehicle efficiency. Our 50-psi Michelin low-rolling-resistance tires became just average at low ambient temperatures. Cool seals, bearings and lubricants have more friction. The air flowing over and around our 0.19-Cd electric bullet got thicker and more viscous as temperatures fell. Then there are accessory loads: lights, heater and (in wet weather) wipers.

But this was a hot, dry summer night, my NiMH pack should have been good for 120 miles, and my after-work meeting was only 30 miles from work. Should have been a piece of cake to get home afterward, even with lights on at 70-80-mph freeway speeds. But it wasn't. (post continues after the jump)

Editor's Note: If you missed Gary's previous articles on the history of GM's EV1, please start here. This post is the third of three posts where he answers reader questions that the EV1 series raised. Part I is here and Part II is here. Once again, questions may have been edited for space.

Honest answers to more probing questions.

You brush off the important facts that led many people to believe in a conspiracy theory. For example, you say, 'For whatever reason...only 500 EV1's were built.' What is the reason? As you mentioned, the EV1 wasn't marketed or meant to be the only car a family/individual would have, so 130-140 miles of range is PLENTY if the car is a COMMUTER car. -- cazancoz

The reason should be crystal clear. We built about 1,000 EV1s over two model years, and Saturn dealers in five CA and AZ cities managed to lease just 80 percent of them. Contrary to what some believe, you can't market/advertise your way to healthy sales of something most people simply don't want -- even with the higher-energy optional '99-model NiMH battery that could stretch the range to more than 100 miles. Like you, we thought that would be enough for a commuter car in a time of $1.40 gas. Like you, we were wrong.

Yeah, right! GM really wanted the EV1 to be a success. That's why lessees had to be able to comply with a long list of conditions BEFORE they were allowed to lease an EV1, like you had to have a garage and park your car in it every night. It was exceedingly difficult to lease an EV1. The process and delays put many people off. Rules that were applied to an EV1 were NEVER applied to any other GM car. -- Randy C.

The answer, and more, after the jump.

Editor's Note: If you missed Gary's previous articles on the history of GM's EV1, please start here. This post is the second of three posts where he answers reader questions that the EV1 series raised. Part I is here and Part III will run tomorrow. Gary's promised to move on to current and relevant topics after we finish with Part III. Once again, questions may have been edited for space. To read the full questions and see the discussion threads they were a part of, click on the questioner's name.

Honest answers to more of your probing questions.

Please mention the RAV4 EV, acknowledge its existence! What did Toyota do that was so much better than the miserable EV1 failure when designing their RAV4 EV on an existing drivetrain? Are the ones still being driven every day a giant fluke? Let's get some serious discussion going instead of earning those GM dollars. I understand they're paying for ad-space and subsidizing your "professional opinion." The only thing Toyota did differently was not crush all their electric cars, 'cause they knew they weren't bad cars. Now those very cars are disputing every "fact" you try to fool readers with as an "unbiased" journalist. – Matt Lenart

Let's have an agreement, Matt: I won't insult your intelligence, you don't question my integrity. I have been telling the true EV1 story as I lived and observed it. Is Toyota paying you?

Regarding those RAV4 EVs, here are the facts straight from Toyota Safety and Quality Communications Manager Brian Lyons: They built and marketed 1,485 of them between 1998 and 2003 -- 80 percent leased to commercial fleets and 20 percent (about 300) sold, all in California. All the early 1998 and '99 models have been "retired," while 95 percent of the 811 still in service are '02 and '03 models with longer-range NiMH packs. Of those, 434 are in fleet operations (utilities, etc...), 104 are in public-service, philanthropic and TMS (Toyota Motor Sales) operations and just 273 are privately owned.

Lyons says their range when new was 80-100 miles, and "many" - depending on usage, environment, and charge/discharge cycles - still achieve 95 percent of their initial performance with their original battery packs. Their drive motor is a 50kW (67 hp) unit good for 140 lb-ft of torque, and their packs are 24 sealed NiMH batteries totaling 288 volts. Service support is "the same as for all Toyota vehicles, with specialists available for difficult cases." The retired vehicles "had all the viable/critical/unique parts removed and are warehoused by [an unnamed] company contracted by Toyota," which also stores and maintains the recovered battery packs.

This post continues after the jump.

Not quite sure what to make of this, but it appears that someone in Victoria, British Columbia has just sold a 1998 EV1 for $465,000 (about $431,835 U.S.). We got a tip from Patrick J. who said that he spotted the ad but was unable to get a hold of the seller before his or her contact information was taken off the ad. Currently the listing claims the vehicle is "SOLD" and the price is the aforementioned $465K. That's quite a jump from the minimum asking price of $75,000, and maybe prompted the transfer, even though the seller wrote: "Don't really want to sell it but I am taking offers." The seller added that the car's been in storage for four years and that "GM still wants the car so I'm looking for car collectors only, depending on the offer."

In any case, if anyone in Oak Bay happens to see an EV1 cruising the streets, think about stopping the driver and asking what they paid for the car. We're all ears.

[Source: Used Victoria]

People are most critical of the things they least understand. – Paul W. Spoor, Bits & Pieces, September 2008.

Why is it so important to some to cast GM as a villain? To believe that the only reason we don't have affordable, practical pure-electric vehicles today is that GM doesn't want us to?

Why is it so difficult to believe that General Motors is not the same sadly mismanaged company it was in the 1970s and '80s? That it's a completely different enterprise run by completely different leaders with completely different values and priorities?

Why so difficult to accept that if GM – or anyone else – could make a buck building and selling the EVs of your dreams, they would be thrilled to do so? And will the minute they can?

As GM (and others) have learned from past, very expensive failed attempts, volume road-worthy EVs require a huge financial investment, and risk. But whoever gets there first with practical, affordable ones will make a killing. Why would any automaker not want to?

And why accuse me of lying or spinning, as some will, for explaining and defending – based on my knowledge and experience – GM, Ford, Chrysler, anyone else who deserves it?

I worked for GM two different times, the first (1965-'73) when it led the global industry and was as proud and arrogant as the day was long. The second (1987-'02) when it teetered on the brink of bankruptcy, learned humility and appointed different kinds of leaders to fix it. In between, as a widely published auto writer, I was as harsh a critic as anyone. I hammered GM's leadership and its products relentlessly, because both were shamefully bad.
But that began to change when Bob Stempel replaced Roger Smith as CEO in 1989 and gained momentum in 1992 when new CEO Jack Smith (no relation to Roger) effectively started to right the still-sinking ship. It's been rough and rocky sailing since, but – contrary to what many believe – GM leadership under current CEO Rick Wagoner has been outstanding.

Like other U.S. makers, they still can't make a living in North America due to high costs, our business-unfriendly government and other conditions beyond their control. But there have been no bad new GM products this decade, and most are world-class competitive, or better. As an employee, I had no great love for GM. As a journalist (again), I'm professionally neutral and objective. But as a former insider, I gained perspective on GM and the industry as a whole that no one who hasn't been there could understand. Also enormous appreciation for the smart, talented, dedicated, hard-working individuals who toil there 10-14 hours every day.

That said, I've responded to some of your questions about my previous columns after the jump.

NOTE: If you missed them, please start by reading parts one, two and three in Gary's EV1 series.

What was learned, and is being applied today

"As has been stated in comments [to the] previous two posts by Mr. Witzenburg, there are several things which just don't add up, and make him look like a half-wit." – ABG reader Virgil.

Despite your gratuitous insult, Virgil, you raise a couple good points in your comment ... and one not so good. You wrote:

"First, aerodynamics. Anyone who's ever been in a canoe knows that a 17-ft canoe is faster than a 14-ft canoe. They're the same width, same frontal area, but the longer boat allows a more shallow angle of attack and tail-off, so is more hydrodynamic. Making a longer EV1 would improve aerodynamic performance, not decrease."

Really? Based on intuition, without data, I would tend to agree. But vehicle aerodynamic behavior on a solid surface is not always intuitive. Our body engineers said their aero analysis showed a meaningful increase in drag from a longer (and flatter) four-seat body vs. a shorter, teardrop-shaped two-passenger one. I'm no expert, but given that no other practical production vehicle has come close to EV1's astounding 0.19 Cd, I have no reason to disbelieve them.

Read more after the break.

NOTE: If you missed them, you can read parts one and two.

High tech development, market launch and retreat

Because its 1,175-pound pack of 27 advanced lead-acid (PbA) batteries - 26 propulsion, one for accessories - held a mere half-gallon of gasoline-equivalent energy, the production EV1 would have to be an incredibly efficient teardrop-shaped two-seater to achieve even barely acceptable range. Stretching it to accommodate four passengers would have reduced its already very modest range some 25 percent due to added weight and aero drag.

"The fundamental variables are mass, aerodynamics, rolling resistance, accessory loads and driveline efficiency," says Bob Purcell, who was our Advanced Technology Vehicles (ATV) Div. Executive Director. "So the exercise was to ensure that we would meet all customer requirements using the least possible energy in each of those areas."

Continue reading after the jump.

Note: read part one of this story here.

Pause and rebirth

I joined the GM EV effort in April, 1991 and began pulling together a small team of test and development engineers and technicians at GM's Proving Grounds near Milford, MI.

One vivid early memory was driving the Impact concept car down a long, steep Proving Grounds hill early one August morning on the way to demonstrate it to a meeting of GM's Board of Directors. There was a sweeping curve near the bottom of this hill that I routinely drove nearly every day on my way to test tracks.

Suddenly, as I sped downhill toward that curve, I remembered that the Impact rolled on skinny, low-rolling-resistance experimental tires, and had almost no brakes. Visions of an expensive career-ending crash flashed through my head. Then I remembered that I could dial up "coast-down" regenerative braking with a rheostat knob between the seats, and that slowed the slippery little bullet enough to make the turn. Whew!

The pause
Sixteen months of hard work later -- on Pearl Harbor Day, Dec. 7, 1992 -- our fearless leader, Ken Baker, had to tell our Lansing, Mich. Craft Centre plant team, who were preparing to build our breakthrough electric vehicle, that the program had been delayed. Then he had to deliver that same emotional message to his engineers at GM's Warren, MI Technical Center.

The story continues after the jump.